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EU coordination of welfare states after the crisis: further
interconnecting soft and hard law
Sonja Bekker*
Tilburg University, the Netherlands
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After the economic shock in 2009, the European Union (EU) changed its economic
governance system considerably. The question is how social policies fare within this
new system. Does stricter economic governance limit the sovereignty of states to
deal with social risks? To answer this question, the article determines the nature of
the EU’s stricter economic governance package and explains how the interconnec-
tion between coordination mechanisms brings employment and social policy areas
within the range of strengthened economic coordination. The article combines an
analysis of new regulations with a study of the actual interaction between the EU
and seven member states in 2011. It concludes that stricter economic governance
gives the EU options to also strengthen employment and social policy coordination.
Yet, the policy response of seven member states shows that there is leeway still in
reacting to new EU demands.
Keywords: EU governance; EU social policy; economic governance
Introduction
The worldwide financial and economic crisis underlined the interdependence of Euro-
pean economies. The budgetary and economic difficulties in a single country affected
the economy of others to a large extent. As a response, European member states sought
for new supranational routes to coordinate national policies by developing stricter eco-
nomic governance. It thus adapted its governance system in order to make member
states comply better with EU demands. The central question of this article is, if this new
economic governance package also changed the coordination of employment and social
policies. Employment and social policies form the heart of each welfare state and are
mostly developed by national public administrations. The EU has little competences in
these policy domains (Hodson, 2009). The question is whether stricter economic gover-
nance has changed this division in competences between member states and EU.
Commentators on the strengthened economic governance suspect that it entails
more binding tools for influencing member states’ employment and social policies
(cf Amtenbrink, 2012; Dinan, 2012). As such, hard law may enter the domains of
social policy coordination, using the backdoor of economic governance (Bekker &
Palinkas, 2012). However, to date analyses of stricter economic governance hardly
specify how economic governance may impact employment and social policies, and
often lack to include country responses to new EU governance in their analyses (see
e.g., Clauwaert & Schömann, 2012).1 This article attempts to fill this void by including
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both the EU and the national level into the analysis. Its focus is on seven member
states that fall within the ordinary surveillance mechanisms of the EU. The article intro-
duces the theoretical notions of interconnections between separate coordination mecha-
nisms and coordination ambiguity and uses these to scrutinize the new sets of
legislation and coordination mechanisms belonging to the economic governance pack-
age. Next, the article examines how these new governance measures operated in the
first new employment and social policy coordination cycle of 2011, by scrutinizing the
responses of seven member states to the new EU demands.
Interconnecting coordination cycles and developing coordination ambiguity
Traditionally, the EU’s coordination of employment and social policies has been
described as soft law governance. Although such coordination is Treaty-based (Art. 148
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), its execution runs via the Open Method
of Co-ordination (OMC), among others meaning that compliance to guidelines is not
legally enforced (D. M. Trubek & L. G. Trubek, 2005; Zeitlin, Pochet, & Magnussen,
2005). The OMC cycle starts off with the Commission suggesting and the Council
adopting EU-level goals, followed by members states writing National Reform Pro-
grammes (NRPs) with national policy responses. Next, based on a Commission recom-
mendation, the Council gives individual feedback to countries in Country-specific
Recommendations (CSRs). The goals set within OMCs are rather flexible and may be
quickly adapted to altered circumstances or adjusted to a specific national context
(Goetschy, 1999). This flexibility was used when the crisis started impacting labor mar-
kets, turning fighting unemployment and softening the social consequences of the crisis
into a priority (European Commission, 2011a). The mechanisms explaining the OMC’s
effectiveness are naming and shaming, diffusion through discourse, deliberation
between actors, learning, sharing best practices and networking (D. M. Trubek & L. G.
Trubek, 2005). Conversely, the legislative route exists of legally binding obligations
that are rather precisely formulated and that transfer authority for interpreting and
implementing law (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). Sanctions are part of the set of instruments
to trigger changes in member states.
In spite of the terms ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ implying otherwise, the OMC should not be
viewed as the opposite of hard law (Smismans, 2011; Trubek, Cottrell, & Nance, 2005).
Current theoretical developments point at interconnections between soft and hard
governance methods. Such interconnections may emerge when separate coordination
mechanisms deal with the same subject (Trubek et al., 2005), essentially bringing similar
policy items within the evaluation cycle of distinct coordination mechanisms. Such ‘dou-
ble’ evaluation may result in diverging recommendations for a single item, depending of
the particular aim and viewpoint of each coordination mechanism. These contradictory
recommendations may cause confusion, for instance about which direction should be
prioritized. For example, if wage growth is an item under economic coordination as well
as employment coordination, and these two cycles have different suggestions for wage
development, member states can hardly follow one recommendation without breaching
the other. Such confusion gives rise to coordination ambiguity, as it remains unclear
which coordination mechanism applies to what policy aspect or which coordination
mechanism prevails in case of conflicting goals and policy advices (Zeitlin, 2010). The
example on wage growth shows moreover that it is quite hard to make a clear distinction
between purely economic and purely social policy topics. After all, economic policies
may have social aspects or social consequences while social policies may have economic




























and fiscal dimensions (Zeitlin, 2010). However, Treaty-wise, EU competences are clearly
separated, giving the EU more enforcement rights in economic and fiscal areas than in
employment and social policy areas. The latter is largely the domain of member states
and social partners, at least up until stricter economic governance was introduced
(Hodson, 2009). Stricter economic governance might have changed this division in com-
petences, potentially limiting the leeway for national public administrations to develop
welfare states according to their own insights.
Methodology
This article first assesses all four coordination mechanisms that have been integrated
within the first European Semester of policy coordination. This semester covers the first
six months of each year and within its scope fiscal, economic, employment and social
policies are jointly coordinated. In 2011, four different coordination mechanisms are
part of the European Semester: the Europe 2020 Strategy, the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP), the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) and the Euro Plus Pact. The
assessment includes establishing to what degree these mechanisms contain ‘binding’
provisions. This is relevant, as through interconnecting coordination mechanisms, the
binding provisions of one coordination mechanism may influence the nature of coordi-
nation within other cycles. The level of being binding is established by using the
continuum of Abbott and Snidal (2000), with which the degree of obligation, precision,
and delegation of a rule is determined. In its most extreme form, hard law has maxi-
mum levels at all three properties. The level of obligation means the extent to which
the member state is legally bound by a specific rule and whether its behavior is subject
to scrutiny (cf Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter, & Snidal, 2000). Indicators for
obligation are active monitoring by third parties and the ability to impose sanctions. A
high level of precision means that a rule or norm is unambiguously defined, refraining
from vague terms that offer room for various interpretations. Indicators for precision
are whether the Council refers to specific national policy programs and whether precise
deadlines indicate the terms of implementation. The extent to which delegation takes
place is assessed by viewing whether third parties, in this case the European Commis-
sion or the Council, have the authority to implement, interpret and apply the rules and
may propose new rules. For each of the four coordination mechanisms employment
and social policy areas are highlighted. In case these mechanisms deal with similar pol-
icy topics, interconnections between coordination cycles is established. The data
sources used, are EU regulations and policy documents that introduce and explain the
four coordination mechanisms, meaning the legislation and policy documents that
belong to the stricter economic governance package.
Next, the analysis explores the interactions between seven member states and the
EU in 2011. This year is chosen, as it is the first year in which the new economic gov-
ernance system was largely in operation. The assessment is based on EU-level and
national policy documents belonging to the employment and social policy cycle, such
as the Annual Growth Survey with EU targets, the NRPs of seven member states and
the corresponding CSRs. Such documents have been used before to assess the employ-
ment OMC in operation (see e.g., Copeland & Ter Haar, 2013; Thillaye, 2013).2 Indi-
cators measuring the leeway for countries are their ability to develop their own targets,
choose their own policies and determine their own reform pace. The seven case
countries are Germany (DE), France (FR), Spain (ES), Poland (PL), the Netherlands





























consideration that all countries are part of the same policy cycles, yet, may experience
different degrees of peer pressure, as they belong to different groups of member states.
The case countries differ regarding their Eurozone membership (DE, FR, ES, NL are
Eurozone members, and PL, UK, DK are not) and economic climate in 2011 (with ES
facing severe economic difficulties and to a lesser extent also FR and UK). Eurozone
countries have to meet stricter rules and are liable to sanctions more often, whereas
countries in difficult economic circumstances usually have progressed in a coordination
cycle towards the corrective stages. Thus, both Eurozone countries and countries in bad
economic weather may feel more pressure to meet EU demands and therefore may
experience less leeway to respond to these demands. All seven case countries are part
of the Europe 2020 cycle, and all have progressed towards the corrective arm of the
SGP, which is the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). The UK, Denmark and Poland
do not run the risk of getting fines and may therefore experience less peer pressure to
meet strengthened EU demands. In addition, all but the UK signed the Euro Plus Pact.
Overall, the assumption is that Poland and Denmark experience the lowest peer
pressure to comply with stricter EU demands, because they do not have the Euro as a
currency and their economies were doing well in 2011.
Expanding interconnections through stricter economic governance
Europe 2020
After 2010, the EU changed its governance structure and created the European Semester
within which four coordination mechanisms jointly analyze the progress of countries.
One of these mechanisms is the Europe 2020 Strategy. It aims at smart, sustainable and
inclusive growth, and includes employment and social policy targets such as having
75% of 20 to 64 year-olds in employment and a reduction of people in or at risk of pov-
erty by 20 million by 2020. Europe 2020 introduced the option for member states to
define their own quantitative targets, also if these are below EU ambitions. In this sense,
member states have gotten more leeway to respond to EU level goals. In line with
Treaty provisions, Europe 2020 is a soft law coordination cycle. Yet it has become more
precise, as from 2010 member states have to give deadlines for policy conversion in
their NRPs as well as spell out detailed policy steps (Bekker, 2013). Because member
states are still the ones to formulate their own policy steps, more precision is not neces-
sarily accompanied by more obligation or delegation. Another novelty is that the EU
attaches deadlines to the CSRs, expecting national policy changes within 12 to 18
months (European Commission, 2011b). Additionally, in spite of attempts to simplify
coordination by decreasing the number of economic and employment guidelines, the
overall set of targets has expanded. Apart from the EU 2020 goals, the Commission
introduced thematic flagship initiatives, as well as spelled out short-term targets in the
Annual Growth Surveys and midterm targets in the Employment Package.
Stability and growth pact
Economic policies are scrutinized via the SGP, encompassing hard and soft law elements.
Its preventative arm contains soft law reporting in annual stability or convergence pro-
grams, while its corrective arm, the EDP, combines a rather soft early warning mechanism
with hard fines for Eurozone countries that keep failing to meet the criteria of having a
maximum deficit of 3% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). An early warning system




























should prevent the occurrence of an excessive deficit. If such a warning does not lead to
better performance, the Commission will draft more specific recommendations, request-
ing the member state to take corrective actions. Thus, as a country progresses in a certain
coordination mechanism, precision in policy recommendations increases. Although the
option to take corrective measures existed prior to the implementation of stricter eco-
nomic governance, the actual use of fines has never been decided upon, even though the
situation in some countries could have justified such interventions (Morris, Ongena, &
Schuknecht, 2006). Stricter economic governance therefore introduced new elements, one
being that member states whose debt exceeds 60% of GDP also enter the EDP. They need
to lower debt at a pre-defined pace (Council, 2011a). This makes policy coordination
more precise but also expands the delegation of authority to include the height of debt. To
facilitate the operation of the corrective arm, a new voting procedure has been installed,
somewhat lowering the role of political processes that could block a Commission conclu-
sion. This increases the level of obligation. Voting is now based on the reverse majority
rule, considering the Commission’s proposal for imposing sanctions as being adopted,
unless the Council votes against it by qualified majority. Within the set of sanctions for
euro-area countries novelties are incorporated as well, ranging from a non-interest-bearing
deposit amounting to 0.2% of GDP to the conversion of this deposit into a fine of 0.2%
of GDP if the deficit is not corrected (Bekker & Klosse, 2013). Further non-compliance
will result in the sanction being stepped up to 0.5% of GDP. Concluding, more soft as
well as hard law elements have been introduced in the SGP, overall taking steps on the
continuum towards more precision, obligation and delegation. This is also relevant for
employment and social policy issues, as topics belonging to this domain are part of the
economic policy coordination. The broad economic policy guidelines encourage the right
framework conditions for wage bargaining systems and moreover advocate consistency
of labor cost developments with price stability, productivity trends and the need to reduce
external imbalances.
Euro plus pact and macro-economic imbalances procedure
To some extent the overlap between economic and employment policy coordination
already existed prior to 2010, however, the introduction of joint assessment within the
European Semester, as well as the implementation of two new coordination mecha-
nisms furthers coordination ambiguity. One new coordination mechanism is the soft
law Euro Plus Pact to which countries can voluntary sign up and report on in their
NRPs (European Council, 2011). It includes topics such as labor costs in relation to
productivity and wage-setting arrangements, including the degree of centralization in
the bargaining process (Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area, 2011). The
second is the MIP, which has a preventative and a corrective arm, containing a soft
start and a hard law end for Eurozone countries that repetitively fail to meet EU
demands (EP and Council, 2011a). The soft arm starts with a scoreboard of indicators
to evaluate country performance. This scoreboard has a range of other functions as
well, and these resemble the characteristics of soft law, such as benchmarking and trig-
gering learning effects. However, some of its characteristics lean closer towards hard
law, including acting as an alert system to timely assess macro-economic and competi-
tive imbalances and serving as a basis to issue warnings to member states. If the score-
board reveals deviating trends, the Commission undertakes an in-depth study to explore
whether potential imbalances are harmless or problematic. Next, a recommendation





























plan of action (EP and Council, 2011a). For Eurozone countries the corrective arm is
accompanied with an enforcement mechanism consisting of an interest-bearing deposit
which can be converted into a fine (up to 0.1% of GDP). In the corrective stage, mem-
ber states are monitored more closely and recommendations become more detailed,
including specific action plans, deadlines and time tables for surveillance. As such this
stage characterizes more precision, delegation of authority and obligation. Employment
indicators are part of the scoreboard, being the nominal unit labor cost as well as the
unemployment rate. Here, interconnections with the soft Europe 2020 mechanism and
the SGP emerges, as these address similar topics.
Concluding, the introduction of the stricter economic governance package advances
interconnections between soft and hard law steering, mainly due to connecting
economic, fiscal, employment and social policy coordination within the ES. Especially
economic and fiscal policies have been strengthened, with Eurozone counties becoming
liable to sanctions if they do not respond timely to EU demands. The four separate
coordination mechanisms address to some extent the same topics, for example unem-
ployment and wages. This interlinkage of soft employment and social policies with
binding economic and fiscal coordination cycles, generates coordination ambiguity. It
moreover leads to tensions between competences of EU-level versus national-level pub-
lic administrations. Although the Treaty gives the EU different competences per policy
area, in practice, the borders between policy areas seem blurred. The Commission reas-
sures that it minds national sovereignty, for instance by referring in the MIP regulation
to Treaty Article 152 TFEU on respecting national practices and institutions for wage
formation and Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, claiming not to affect
the right to negotiate, conclude collective agreements or to take collective action (EP
and Council, 2011b). Still, the MIP addresses topics that the Treaty considers to be typ-
ically member state matters, such as wages. The next sections analyze the first coordi-
nation cycle under the new regime to establish whether economic governance also
limits the leeway of member states in practice.
Targets on which member states report
First, the article establishes which goals countries address in their national reports and
whether these include economic and fiscal policies. Usually, NRPs respond to non-
binding economic policy guidelines and social and employment policy guidelines
(Council, 2005). In the 2011 NRPs, all case countries are very aware of the EU’s
targets, however, there is great variety in the type of targets to which they respond. It
signals that in 2011, the case countries have some leeway in choosing which targets to
report on. For instance, the UK and FR refer to both the employment guidelines and
the broad economic policy guidelines. Poland also refers to some of these guidelines,
however, more often chooses to relate its policies to the EU’s thematic flagship initia-
tives. The UK, ES, DE, DK, FR, NL mention the Annual Growth Survey, although
most of these countries only address (part of) these targets without necessarily taking
these into account when describing policies. All seven countries refer to the quantitative
headline targets and all but the UK report on the Euro Plus Pact requirements. All case
countries but Poland refer to yet another set of goals: country specific bottlenecks
adopted by the ECOFIN Council. These predominantly address macroeconomic and
financial issues, but sometimes also labor market bottlenecks, such as human capital
formation and labor market functioning (Bekker, 2013). Apparently, these bottlenecks
have been communicated to countries as well, yet, seemingly outside the scope of the




























ordinary European Semester coordination cycles. This gives rise to coordination ambi-
guity, while encouraging countries to pick-and-choose which goals to report on, thus
improving the leeway countries have to respond to EU demands.
In line with the option given by the EU, member states have set their own quantita-
tive goals, resulting in an overall less ambitious Europe 2020. Regarding employment
rates, the joint plans of 27 member states will result in 73.4 to 74% employment in
2020 instead of the 75% the EU aims for (European Commission, 2011c). The Nether-
lands seems quite ambitious by setting its employment rate target at 80%. However, its
NRP explains that this entails a gross employment rate measured by national standards,
thus deviating strongly from the EU-level definition. Also the UK deviates from the
EU standard and does not give an employment target at all. Regarding the reduction of
poverty, national definitions vary as well, and include sometimes the reduction of job-
less households. Overall, member states still seem to have much leeway in their
response to EU level quantitative targets. This observation is consistent with findings
on the effectiveness of soft law prior to 2010, in which member states often see NRPs
as a reporting device rather than a vehicle for transforming national policies (Mailand,
2008; Copeland & Ter Haar, 2013).
Policy responses of countries
Second, the article explores whether binding economic and fiscal requirements are
mentioned at all in the NRPs, even if not directly referring to overall targets. All seven
case countries were in the EDP in 2011, of which NL, DE, FR and ES belong to the
Eurozone (European Commission, 2013). The macroeconomic targets play some role in
all seven NRPs, first of all by explicitly referring to the stability or convergence pro-
grams for a more detailed outline of economic and budgetary measures. For example,
France is aware of the impact of stricter economic governance on the soft coordination
of employment and social policies and thereby touches upon possible ambiguities in
surveillance viewing the mixture of different coordination forms: ‘The National Reform
Program therefore takes on an entirely new dimension ... Together with the Stability
Program, this is now the cornerstone of the new system of coordination, which blends
surveillances of national fiscal frameworks with structural reforms’ (French
Government, 2011, p. 3). Nonetheless, all seven NRPs show that countries take their
own route in fulfilling EU level goals. For instance, Poland argues that it delivers EU
targets while tackling national growth bottlenecks. The NRPs moreover show that
meeting economic and financial targets impacts employment and social security,
revealing that the integration of policy fields may result in coordination ambiguity. For
example, the UK places the reform of its welfare system as a way to contribute to the
fiscal consolidation plans. France argues that the application of its pension reform
should improve the sustainability of public finances, and moreover mentions that
structural reforms, being reforms in labor markets and social policies, are key to reduce
macroeconomic imbalances. Germany, conversely, aims at fiscal consolidation without
obstructing the potential for growth or threatening social balance. It thus plans to
introduce more incentives to take up work, to reform the health care insurance system,
but also to invest in education, research, and innovation.
Third, the article establishes the level of precision of NRPs, to see whether these
reflect the EU demands regarding detailed policy steps and deadlines. The seven NRPs
all show important leeway in reporting details and deadlines, and shows considerable





























Dutch NRP is rather vague. The other case countries show a mix of precise and more
vague reporting, depending on the policy at hand. For example, for each thematic issue
the Polish NRP has quite a detailed list of actions to be taken and specifies which Min-
istry should take the lead. It also includes a list of specific tasks for the year 2011. For
instance, concerning labor market policies, Poland defines 16 action lines and 14 tasks
to be carried out in 2011. Task 3.1.12 is the facilitation of reconciling work and care
and the development of child care institutions for children aged up to 3 years, to be
carried out by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy. One task for this Ministry is
the implementation of the Act of 4 February 2011 on care of children up to 3 years of
age and the start of the Toddler program. Germany also presents a very detailed table
with the name of the plan, its aim, the plan’s status, the scheduled implementation
including a date of entry into force. For instance the scheme Networks for Effective
Assistance for Single Parents, includes quite detailed information such as ‘ESF-funded
program (financial budget: €25 million) to promote the development and expansion of
local support structures for single parents at roughly 100 locations across Germany.
An external service provider provides advice and coaching on the project design and
setup. The progress of the individual projects is analysed and the results are evaluated
scientifically at programme level. Funding period: April 2011 to June 2013’ (German
Government, 2011, p. 41). Conversely, the Dutch NRP 2011 is far from detailed. It
lacks concrete policy steps and does not give dates for implementation. For example, it
devotes only ten lines to its key reform proposal that should solve much of its labor
market and social policy challenges, most notably for people who are distanced from
the labor market. It neither mentions what the measure entails exactly, what the budget
is, nor when it will be implemented: ‘Through the Work Capacity Act the government
wishes to reform the Work and Social Assistance Act, Invalidity Insurance (Young Dis-
abled Persons) Act and Sheltered Employment Act and move towards a locally imple-
mented scheme for the lower end of the labour market’. Dutch Government, 2011,
p. 11). This vagueness is probably related to the installment of a new government,
making it rather impossible to come up with a set of well-outlined plans.
The other case countries mix detailed information with vague plans, or describe
past reform efforts. For instance, France often refer to programs that are already imple-
mented. However, it sometimes also describes new plans, at times including a date for
implementation and the amount of budget involved, such as the plan to raise the num-
ber of people in alternating work-study schemes to 800,000 in 2015. Also Denmark’s
NRP looks back at the history of reforms that contributed to its current position. It
moreover gives concrete measures to address the EU’s targets, among which plans to
improve labor supply and employment by raising the early retirement age from 2014
and the public pension age from 2019.
The level of precision the seven countries display in their 2011 NRPs does not
show a clear division between Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries. Poland for
instance is not a Eurozone member, but still has quite a detailed NRP, whereas the
Netherlands, which is a Eurozone country, only has broad policy plans in its 2011
NRP. In addition, the two member states in this study with the best performing econo-
mies, Germany and Poland, have the most detailed NRPs. In 2011, being a Eurozone
member or facing deep recession thus does not seem to result automatically in compli-
ance with the new EU demands concerning precision. This is contrary to the assump-
tion that such countries would experience more pressure to meet EU demands.




























Country-specific recommendations for member states
Fourth, a review of the CSRs shows whether stricter coordination may be detected in
this part of the European Semester policy cycle. The CSRs of 2011 interconnect policy
fields further and have various legal backgrounds (Thillaye, 2013). This deviates from
pre-2010 CSRs, that are solely soft policy suggestions (Bekker, 2013; Thillaye, 2013).
The general text preceding the CSRs explains that the Euro Plus Pact commitments
(except for the UK that did not sign this pact) have been taken into account when
drafting the recommendations. Moreover, it sets out which recommendations are
attached to the SGP, and thus may have eventually a legally binding effect. All seven
countries have received a first CSR either on fiscal consolidation measures or on bud-
getary strategies agreed upon in the context of the EDP. In addition, the second CSR of
PL, UK and NL also refers to the EDP, thus attaching these to an eventually binding
coordination mechanism.
In three of the seven case countries, social policies are part of a CSR that refers to
the SGP and its corrective arm. This gives rise to some coordination ambiguity, espe-
cially in the second CSR for the Netherlands which recommends the Netherlands to
reform its pension system in a rather specific way. ‘Take measures to increase the statu-
tory retirement age by linking it to life expectancy, and underpin these measures with
others to raise the effective retirement age and to improve the long-term sustainability
of public finances’. (Council, 2011b, p.15). Given the fact that this CSR is posed while
explicitly referring to Treaty Article 126(7), it is a direct basis for imposing fines in
case of perpetual non-compliance. Yet, pensions also belong to the ‘soft law’ cycle of
social policies in which the EU has little legislative power to coerce member state com-
pliance. Using both these mechanisms for the same policy topic thus contributes to
coordination ambiguity. To Germany the CSR based on the SGP also addresses the effi-
ciency of public spending on health-care and long-term care, while for France the
Council proposes to review the sustainability of the pension system. The first CSRs
also indicate an investment approach for DE, NL, PL, UK, mentioning to consolidate
in a sustainable and growth-friendly way, meaning for the Netherlands that expenditure
on research and innovation, education and training should be protected in order to safe-
guard future growth.
All the other CRSs that the seven case countries received, do not refer back to
eventually binding legal bases. These soft CSRs address a greater variety of social and
employment issues and are tailored to country-specific challenges, for instance to com-
bat labor market segmentation (FR), enhance labor participation (DE, NL), raise female
labor participation (PL), increase labor supply (DK), revise employment protection leg-
islation (FR), and improve human capital (FR, PL, UK). Regarding poverty, only the
UK received a CSR, be it related to its budgetary commitments. ‘Take measures, within
current budgetary plans, to reduce the number of workless households by targeting
those who are inactive because of caring responsibilities, including lone parents’.
(Council, 2011c, p. 14). This latter remark suggests a hierarchy, making budgetary
commitments more relevant than fighting poverty. Given the fact that it is a soft recom-
mendation, it may not automatically limit the leeway of the UK to design its welfare
state. Still, it signals a tension between meeting social policy goals and budgetary
requirements.
Fifth, analyzing precision, leads to the conclusion that at times CSRs are quite
detailed about how a member state should reach a certain goal. For instance Germany





























high tax wedge in a budget neutral way and by giving people with a low income more
incentives to work. Deadlines for policy conversion also reflect precision. The general
deadline of 12 to 18 months applies to all case countries, as the list of recommenda-
tions always starts with the message that action should be taken within the period
2011–2012. Sometimes deadlines are attached to individual CSRs, most notably to the
financial and budgetary targets that refer to deadlines set in the SGP or EDP. Yet, also
other types of CSRs contain deadlines, such as Spain that has to assess the impact of
two labor market reforms by the end of 2011 and the UK that should adopt a compre-
hensive strategy to reduce early school-leaving by the end of 2012.
Conclusion
After the crisis the EU has been developing a stricter economic governance program.
Some policy cycles have been strengthened with soft as well as hard law elements,
while new coordination cycles have been implemented. Moreover, the coordination of
fiscal, economic, social and employment policies cycles are now integrated within the
European Semester for joint assessment. These actions interconnect coordination mech-
anisms further. The analysis shows that separate coordination mechanisms evaluate the
same policy items, also bringing social policy items under economic surveillance. This
finding means that stricter economic governance challenges the boundaries of EU com-
petences and the sovereignty of states to deal with social policies. For example, even
though the Treaty states that member states have autonomy in most welfare state dos-
siers, economic governance nevertheless ties pensions and health care to the eventually
binding SGP. The interconnection of distinct coordination cycles moreover contributes
to coordination ambiguity, as it is unclear which items fall within the scope of what
coordination mechanism. Yet, looking at the impact of new economic governance on
seven member state’s practices, a mixed picture emerges. A first finding is that coun-
try-specific recommendations are quite precise and now include deadlines and detailed
policy suggestions. The national reports on meeting EU-level goals, also show aware-
ness of the EU’s stricter coordination. Yet, in 2011 countries still have leeway in
responding to EU demands. Also Eurozone countries and countries experiencing eco-
nomic difficulties have such leeway in 2011, although these countries are under more
EU pressure to comply. Countries pick-and-choose to which targets to report and do
not always give detailed accounts of policy implementation. It is likely that the tension
between the competences of EU and national public administrations will grow with
each European Semester, as new coordination mechanisms, such as the MIP, will be
integrated better into the existing framework, while some countries will progress into
corrective stages of coordination mechanisms. This will probably call to review the
competences the EU and the member states have to develop welfare state arrangements
while minding economic and fiscal targets.
Notes
1. More attention has been paid to the far-reaching restrictions for social and employment
policies in bail-out countries that have received large loans (see e.g., Clauwaert & Schömann,
2012; Costamagna, 2012).
2. All documents belonging to the European Semester of policy coordination are publicly avail-
able via the Commission’s Europe 2020 website: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020.
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